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VIA CERTIFIED MAIL

February 7, 2022

Mary Locke, President  
Sherman Garnett, Clerk  
Upland Unified School District  
390 North Euclid Avenue  
Upland, CA 91786

*Re: Violation of California Voting Rights Act*

I write on behalf of our client, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project and its members, as well as Daniel Hernandez. This letter follows our previous letter in 2017 that was ignored by the Upland Unified School District (“Upland USD”). I promise that if this letter is ignored, Upland USD will find itself embroiled in litigation for its continued violation of the California Voting Rights Act.

Upland USD relies upon an at-large election system for electing candidates to its Board of Trustees. Moreover, voting within Upland USD is racially polarized, resulting in minority vote dilution, and therefore Upland USD’s at-large elections violate the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (“CVRA”).

The CVRA disfavors the use of so-called “at-large” voting – an election method that permits voters of an entire jurisdiction to elect candidates to each open seat. *See generally Sanchez v. City of Modesto* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 660, 667 (“*Sanchez*”). For example, if the U.S. Congress were elected through a nationwide at-large election, rather than through typical single-member districts, each voter could cast up to 435 votes and vote for any candidate in the country, not just the candidates in the voter's district, and the 435 candidates receiving the most nationwide votes would be elected. At-large elections thus allow a bare majority of voters to control *every* seat, not just the seats in a particular district or a proportional majority of seats.

Voting rights advocates have targeted “at-large” election schemes for decades, because they often result in “vote dilution,” or the impairment of minority groups’ ability to elect their preferred candidates or influence the outcome of elections, which occurs when the electorate votes in a racially polarized manner. *See Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) (“*Gingles*”). The U.S. Supreme Court “has long recognized that multi-member

districts and at-large voting schemes may operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength” of minorities. *Id.* at 47; *see also id.* at 48, fn. 14 (at-large elections may also cause elected officials to “ignore [minority] interests without fear of political consequences”), citing *Rogers v. Lodge*, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982); *White v. Register*, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973). “[T]he majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters.” *Gingles*, at 47. When racially polarized voting occurs, dividing the political unit into single-member districts, or some other appropriate remedy, may facilitate a minority group's ability to elect its preferred representatives. *Rogers*, at 616.

Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act (“FVRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973, which Congress enacted in 1965 and amended in 1982, targets, among other things, at-large election schemes. *Gingles* at 37; *see also* Boyd & Markman, *The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History* (1983) 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1402. Although enforcement of the FVRA was successful in many states, California was an exception. By enacting the CVRA, “[t]he Legislature intended to expand protections against vote dilution over those provided by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965.” *Jauregui v. City of Palmdale* (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 781, 808. Thus, while the CVRA is similar to the FVRA in several respects, it is also different in several key respects, as the Legislature sought to remedy what it considered “restrictive interpretations given to the federal act.” Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 9, 2002, p. 2.

The California Legislature dispensed with the requirement in *Gingles* that a minority group demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a “majority-minority district.” *Sanchez*, at 669. Rather, the CVRA requires only that a plaintiff show the existence of racially polarized voting to establish that an at-large method of election violates the CVRA, not the desirability of any particular remedy. *See* Cal. Elec. Code § 14028 (“A violation of Section 14027 *is established* if it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs ...”) (emphasis added); *also see* Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 9, 2002, p. 3 (“Thus, this bill puts the voting rights horse (the discrimination issue) back where it sensibly belongs in front of the cart (what type of remedy is appropriate once racially polarized voting has been shown).”)

To establish a violation of the CVRA, a plaintiff must generally show that “racially polarized voting occurs in elections for members of the governing body of the political subdivision or in elections incorporating other electoral choices by the voters of the political subdivision.” Elec. Code § 14028(a). The CVRA specifies the elections that are most probative: “elections in which at least one candidate is a member of a protected class or elections involving ballot measures, or other electoral choices that affect the rights and privileges of members of a protected class.” Elec. Code § 14028(a). The



CVRA also makes clear that “[e]lections conducted prior to the filing of an action ... are more probative to establish the existence of racially polarized voting than elections conducted after the filing of the action.” *Id.*

Factors other than “racially polarized voting” that are required to make out a claim under the FVRA – under the “totality of the circumstances” test – “are probative, but not necessary factors to establish a violation of” the CVRA. Elec. Code § 14028(e). These “other factors” include “the history of discrimination, the use of electoral devices or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the dilutive effects of at-large elections, denial of access to those processes determining which groups of candidates will receive financial or other support in a given election, the extent to which members of a protected class bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process, and the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns.” *Id.*

Upland USD’s at-large system dilutes the ability of Latinos (a “protected class”) – to elect candidates of their choice or otherwise influence the outcome of Upland USD’s Board of Trustees’ elections.

Upland USD’s election history is illustrative: during the past 25 years, only two Latinos have emerged as candidates for a seat on the Board of Trustees – both of whom lost. Opponents of fair, district-based elections may attribute the lack of Latinos vying for elected positions to a lack of Latino interest in local government. On the contrary, the alarming absence of Latino candidates seeking election to the Upland USD Board of Trustees reveals vote dilution. See *Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego*, 872 F. 2d 1201, 1208-1209, n. 9 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989).

According to recent data, Latinos comprise almost 60% of the Upland USD’s student population. And, according to the California Department of Education, over 36% of the District’s total resident population of 72,326 are Latino. However, in the District’s history, there has not been one Latino to ever serve on the Upland USD Board of Trustees. Therefore, not only is the contrast between the significant Latino proportion of the electorate and the total absence of Latinos to be elected to the Board outwardly disturbing, it is also fundamentally hostile towards Latino participation.

Upland USD’s Board of Trustees’ election history demonstrates racially polarized voting and the inability of Latinos within the District to elect their preferred candidate or influence the outcome of elections. In the most recent 2020 election, Ms. Denise Martinez sought a seat on the Upland USD Board of Trustees. Ms. Martinez earned significant support from the District’s Latino voters, but due to a lack of support from non-Hispanic white voters she lost. Similarly, in 2003, Mr. Louie Raymond Hernandez, was also unsuccessful in his efforts to be elected to the Board, despite significant support

from Hispanic voters, falling to three non-Latino candidates. These elections are demonstrative of the vote dilution and impaired ability of Latinos within the Upland USD to elect their preferred candidates or influence the outcome of Board of Trustee elections.

The City of Upland recognized that its electorate is racially polarized and, accordingly, adopted district based elections several years ago. Upland USD must do the same to bring its elections into compliance with the law.

As you may be aware, in 2012, we sued the City of Palmdale for violating the CVRA. After an eight-day trial, we prevailed. After spending millions of dollars, a district-based remedy was ultimately imposed upon the Palmdale city council, with districts that combine all incumbents into one of the four districts.

Given the historical lack of Latino representation on the Board of Trustees in the context of racially polarized elections, we urge Upland USD to voluntarily change its at-large system of electing its trustees. Otherwise, on behalf of residents within the jurisdiction, we will be forced to seek judicial relief. Please advise us no later than March 27, 2022 as to whether you would like to discuss a voluntary change to your current at-large system.

We look forward to your response.

Very truly yours,



Kevin I. Shenkman